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Global telecommunications markets have tra-
ditionally been closed to foreign trade and invest-
ment. Recent World Trade Organization negotia-
tions resulted in a Basic Telecommunications
agreement that sought to construct a multilateral
framework to reverse that trend and begin opening
telecom markets worldwide. Regrettably, this new
WTO framework is quite ambiguous and open to
pro-regulatory interpretations by member states.
In fact, during recent bilateral trade negotiations
with Japan, U.S. government officials adopted the
position that the new framework allowed them to
demand that the Japanese government adopt very
specific regulatory provisions regarding telecom net-
work interconnection and pricing policies. The
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative argued that
Japanese officials should require their domestic tele-
com providers to share their networks with rivals at a
generously discounted price to encourage greater
resale competition.
Those interconnection and line-sharing rules
were borrowed directly from the U.S.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, a piece of leg-
islation that remains the subject of intense
debate within the United States. Good evidence
now exists that those rules generally retard net-
work investment and innovation by encourag-
ing infrastructure sharing over facilities-based
investment. Consequently, the USTR has gener-
ated resentment on the part of Japan and other
trading partners as it has attempted to force
them to adopt heavy-handed telecommunica-
tions mandates that have very little to do with
legitimate free-trade policy. 
The USTR must discontinue efforts to impose
American telecommunications regulations on
other countries as part of free-trade negotiations
and should instead focus on reforming or elimi-
nating the most serious barriers to foreign direct
investment both here and abroad.
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Introduction
Trade in the $1 trillion global telecommu-
nications services marketplace has always
been riddled with difficulties. Historically,
almost every nation on the planet has erected
barriers to trade in communications services
and imposed restrictions on foreign direct
investment in domestic telecom markets and
companies. In many cases, government own-
ership of telecom infrastructure has made
such trade and investment impossible. But
even where governments did not nationalize
their communications sector, markets were
heavily regulated and foreign interaction was
generally discouraged or greatly restricted. In
essence, there really has never been anything
close to free trade in telecommunications ser-
vices worldwide.
A New Paradigm for Telecom Trade
Negotiations
To begin addressing this problem, in
February 1997, 69 countries signed on to the
World Trade Organization’s Basic Telecom-
munications agreement,1 making it an offi-
cial annex of the WTO’s General Agreement
on Trade in Services.2 One year later, the
Basic Telecom agreement went into effect for
all WTO members as part of the Fourth
Protocol of the GATS.
The WTO’s Basic Telecom agreement
encouraged WTO member states to enter
into negotiations to progressively liberalize
trade in telecoms and open their markets to
foreign access and investment. Dozens of
countries immediately made offers to do so,
but no specific market-opening obligations
were imposed on signatories, and progress
on this front remains sluggish and sporadic. 
However, as part of the Basic Telecom-
munications accord, signatories did agree to
adopt a set of principles and policies to guide
ongoing domestic telecommunications regu-
lation in their countries. The principles were
laid out in a Reference Paper,3 a remarkably
ambiguous document that became part of
the final Basic Telecom agreement. Those
principles included safeguards to prevent
anti-competitive practices, network intercon-
nection requirements, preservation of univer-
sal service subsidization schemes, and an
outline of basic licensing criteria for regula-
tory agencies to follow. “[T]he Reference
Paper has turned out to be malleable into any
policy outcome that imaginative regulators
can reconcile with the document’s unobjec-
tionable desiderata,” argue Jeffrey H. Rohlfs
of Strategic Policy Research, Inc., and J.
Gregory Sidak of the American Enterprise
Institute.4
The danger inherent in such an ambigu-
ous document is that is can be used by some
parties to pervert the primary intention of
the Basic Telecom accord, liberalization of
trade in telecom services. Indeed, a prime
example of how those principles can be
abused occurred just a few years after the
adoption of the WTO agreement when the
United States and Japan began bilateral
negotiations in the late 1990s to address
market access issues.
The FCC’s and USTR’s Pro-Regulatory Bent
Before discussing the U.S.-Japan negotia-
tions, it is important to note that the WTO
Basic Telecom agreement and Reference
Paper were both strongly supported by the
Federal Communications Commission,
which had a major hand in crafting the new
global framework. In fact, many of the prin-
ciples embodied in the Reference Paper were
borrowed directly from the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996.5 As then–FCC chairman
Reed Hundt said after the Basic Telecom
agreement was struck in early 1997, “By this
agreement, the Telecommunications Act
enacted a year ago by Congress has become
the world’s gold standard for pro-competi-
tive deregulation.”6
Unfortunately, Chairman Hundt and the
FCC at the time interpreted the Telecom Act
with a decidedly pro-regulatory bent. In par-
ticular, and as discussed in greater detail
below, Hundt’s FCC expansively read the
Telecom Act’s vague interconnection and
unbundling provisions in such a way as to
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create a highly convoluted and heavy-handed
new regulatory regime of infrastructure shar-
ing in America’s local wireline telephone
marketplace. The intent of these controver-
sial rules—which remain the subject of
intense debate in the United States today—
was to encourage new entry by smaller carri-
ers by granting them wholesale access to local
telephone lines at generously low rates. That
would allow smaller carriers to resell tele-
phone service to the public and still make a
profit. Since 1996 these line-sharing rules
and interconnection-pricing policies have
been aggressively enforced by federal and
state regulators who believe such mandates
are the key to introducing competition to the
telephone market. 
Not surprisingly, as the United States and
Japan began telecom market access talks as
part of the Enhanced Initiative on
Deregulation and Competition Policy in
1997, the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative pressed Japan to introduce
similar line-sharing and interconnection-
pricing rules in Japan. For the many reasons
outlined in the next section, however,
America’s interconnection rules and infra-
structure-sharing mandates are not an
appropriate model for ongoing international
trade negotiations on telecommunications
policy matters. The volumes of rules and reg-
ulations spawned by the Telecom Act have
failed to promote facilities-based competi-
tion in the American local telephone market-
place despite what policymakers had hoped.
Indeed, there is strong evidence that the act
has discouraged industry investment and
innovation by encouraging carriers to share
existing wireline networks instead of deploy-
ing new facilities of their own.
The USTR has no business trying to
forcibly transplant this controversial and
economically questionable model to foreign
countries. Market access talks should focus
on removing traditional barriers to market
access, such as barriers to direct foreign
investment and business ownership. The U.S.
regulatory model should be reconsidered at
home, not imposed abroad. 
USTR Continues Effort to Export
American Telecom Policy
Although the FCC has taken steps to
begin scaling back some of the onerous infra-
structure-sharing rules it has imposed within
the United States, it appears that the USTR is
still attempting to force Japan (and other
countries through bilateral negotiations) to
adopt those convoluted rules as part of “free-
trade” talks.
For example, in the spring and fall of each
year the U.S. government issues a set of
demands and recommendations to Japan
with respect to its telecommunications poli-
cies and practices. Some time in late March
or early April, the results of the annual review
of foreign compliance with telecommunica-
tions trade agreements (known as the section
1377 review) are announced by the USTR.7
In October, the USTR also presents Japan
with reform recommendations and proposals
focusing on key industry sectors, including
telecommunications. Those recommendations
are issued pursuant to the Regulatory Reform
and Competition Policy Initiative (the
Regulatory Reform Initiative), which replaced
the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and
Competition Policy. This new effort was
launched under the U.S.-Japan Economic
Partnership for Growth,8 which was designed
by the two governments to further deregulate
their economies, bolster competition, and open
markets. This initiative is a bidirectional
exchange of recommendations; Japan also
makes reform proposals to the United States
for strengthening U.S.-Japan bilateral trade and
economic relations.9
The initiative and partnership are con-
structive as long as they actually help to accel-
erate structural reforms in both countries,
including the opening of telecom markets.
But do they accomplish that objective? And
do the initiatives serve as a good model for
ongoing bilateral or multilateral telecommu-
nications negotiations?
Again, to the extent those negotiations are
aimed at examining legitimate barriers to
trade and investment, they are constructive.
Unfortunately, however, recent negotiations
3
Market access
talks should
focus on remov-
ing traditional
barriers to mar-
ket access, such as
barriers to direct
foreign invest-
ment and busi-
ness ownership. 
have become bogged down with U.S. efforts
to export very detailed, and quite controver-
sial, regulatory policies that should not be
the focus of trade negotiations with Japan or
any other country. 
Moreover, the obsession with ensuring
competition on local telephone networks
ignores an important fact: those networks
are quickly becoming obsolete with the pro-
liferation of rigorous wireless competition
and the advent of digital, packet-based
broadband systems. As wireless and packet-
based Internet systems become substitutes
for traditional analog, circuit-switched wire-
line telephone networks, it is unclear why
trade policy should be preoccupied with opti-
mizing trade over older systems. Nonethe-
less, both the American and the Japanese gov-
ernments are trapped in outmoded discus-
sions of issues peculiar to the pre-Internet
communications age.
Worse yet, the controversial telecom pric-
ing and interconnection regime, which the
United States is trying to export to and
impose on Japan, could be used as the basis
for negotiations between the United States
and other countries. For example, the United
States is involved in ongoing free-trade agree-
ment (FTA) negotiations with Chile and
Singapore, and telecommunications sections
will be included in those agreements.
Although many U.S. telecom carriers and for-
eign government officials originally feared
that similar interconnection mandates and
detailed price controls would be embedded
in those agreements,10 it now appears that
those concerns have been addressed and the
final telecom language in those FTAs will not
resemble that of the Japanese agreement.
Regardless, the USTR must cease efforts
to impose American telecommunications
regulations on other countries as part of any
future free-trade negotiations. Each country
has a right to negotiate with any other coun-
try on any matter, and results of such negoti-
ation should not create suspicion or animos-
ity on the part of trading partners; trade pol-
icy should not create resentment or ill will
between trading partners but instead create a
“win-win” feeling among them. Singapore
officials, for example, were said to be very
worried about possible telecom rule changes
that might be required as part of the FTA
being negotiated with the United States.11
And Japanese officials have been angered by
American efforts to dictate the terms of their
domestic telecom policies. 
Finally, such bilateral trade talks and
agreements need to be viewed within the larg-
er context of ongoing World Trade
Organization efforts to establish clear and
consistent multilateral rules for global trade
in communications services. Convoluted
communications network interconnection
mandates and pricing regulations will not
further that end; in fact, they could set back
ongoing liberalization efforts worldwide. 
The U.S.
Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Managed,
Not Free, Trade
Although it is billed as a historic effort to
deregulate the American communications
marketplace, the Telecommunications Act of
1996 has very little to do with free trade in
the broadest sense of the term. The act is, in
reality, a complex effort to manage markets.
At the bill-signing ceremony on February 8,
1996, then–speaker of the house Newt
Gingrich noted, “This is a bill which correct-
ly uses government to help reshape the pri-
vate sector so that in the marketplace entre-
preneurs compete to please the customer by
offering better services at lower cost in a
dynamic environment.”12
That turned out to be a very prescient
statement. Indeed, under this bill, the gov-
ernment really did attempt to “reshape the
private sector,” but not in ways that necessar-
ily pleased companies or consumers, and cer-
tainly not in ways that agreed with sound
economic policy. 
Particularly problematic in this regard has
been the FCC’s tortuous interpretation and
implementation of sections 251 and 252 of
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the Telecom Act, which deal with “open-
access” requirements for local telephone car-
riers (interconnection, unbundling, line shar-
ing, and the like). Although those sections
took up only a few pages of the Telecom Act,
the FCC promulgated a “Local Competition
Order” in August 1996 to implement the
access-related provisions of the act. The order
weighed in at a staggering 737 pages and
contained more than 3,200 footnotes.13 That
edict, which ranks as one of the longest and
most convoluted rules in the history of regu-
latory policymaking in America, produced a
stream of litigation that continues today. 
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has already
been forced to hand down two mammoth
decisions dealing with the FCC’s controversial
reading of the Telecom Act’s provisions. To
make a very long story short, the FCC’s local
competition rules basically mandated that
local telephone carriers (a) share several ele-
ments of their networks with rivals and (b) do
so at a price set by regulators that was far
below the actual costs the Bells incurred to
build and maintain those networks. The infra-
structure-sharing mandates were supposed to
increase “competition” in the provision of
local telephone service by encouraging new
“rivals”—called Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (CLECs)—to enter the market and
lease elements of existing networks at greatly
discounted rates and then resell the recom-
bined elements for a profit.
The Controversy Goes to the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court dealt with the sensi-
bility of these infrastructure-sharing man-
dates in the 1999 case of AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board14 and ruled that the FCC had overzeal-
ously interpreted the act. The Court’s deci-
sion partially overturned the agency’s man-
dates on the sharing of unbundled network
elements (UNEs)—the distinct elements of
the communications networks owned by
local telephone companies—but regrettably
left much of the FCC’s authority to mandate
such infrastructure sharing intact. Worse yet,
in dealing with the second part of the FCC’s
local competition rules—those regarding
how access to network elements should be
priced and how the local telephone compa-
nies should be compensated—the Court’s
May 2002 decision in Verizon Communications
v. Federal Communications Commission15 was
even more disappointing. Specifically, the
Court reviewed the pricing methodology and
model and total element long-run incremen-
tal cost, or TELRIC, that the FCC created to
accomplish that task. That model has been
highly controversial because it estimates
costs by imagining what it might cost to con-
struct and operate a hypothetical, efficiently
designed network from scratch. Was the
FCC’s cost model fair? Did it adequately
compensate the Bells? Did TELRIC encour-
age enough industry investment? On all
those questions the 7-to-1 majority of the
Court ruled in the affirmative and vindicated
the FCC’s six-year effort to divine costs
through some rather creative regulatory rea-
soning and controversial economic models. 
The Impact of the Rules on Innovation,
Investment, and Competition
The Court’s ruling means that American
regulators will be allowed to continue to
force incumbent telephone companies to
share elements of their networks with rivals
at heavily discounted rates. Although it
remains unclear how big a blow the ruling
will be to ongoing efforts to liberalize the
industry, it will certainly make the transition
to a free market in telecom services more dif-
ficult than was previously expected.
Moreover, despite the Court’s rather lame
defense of the FCC’s system of UNE price
controls, it remains unmistakably clear that
fairy tale regulatory models like TELRIC do
not mesh with economic reality since they
fail to account for the actual costs of building
and maintaining networks. As a conse-
quence, numerous critics have pointed out
that TELRIC-style regulation poses a threat
to industry investment, innovation, and gen-
uine facilities-based competition. 
Alfred Kahn, author of The Economics of
Regulation16 and former chairman of the now-
defunct Civil Aeronautics Board, has referred
5
Fairy tale regula-
tory models like
TELRIC do not
mesh with eco-
nomic reality
since they fail to
account for the
actual costs of
building and
maintaining net-
works.
to the logic behind TELRIC as “regulatory
arrogance” and noted that “by their med-
dling, under enormous pressure to produce
politically attractive results, regulators have
violated the most basic tenets of efficient
competition—that it should be conducted on
the basis of the respective actual incremental
costs of the contending parties; and it is that
competition, rather than regulatory dicta-
tion, that should determine the results.”17
And technology guru George Gilder, author
of Telecosm: How Infinite Bandwidth Will
Revolutionize Our World,18 has argued, “Like any
price-control scheme, TELRIC choked off sup-
ply, taking the profits out of the multibillion-
dollar venture of deploying new broadband
pipers.” Moreover, Gilder adds, open-access and
unbundling mandates discourage broadband
investment by “privatizing the risks and social-
izing the rewards. No entrepreneurs will invest
in risky, technically exacting new infrastructure
when they must share it with rivals.”19
Sadly, only Justice Stephen Breyer gave
those arguments any credence in the two
Supreme Court decisions. It should be noted
that Justice Breyer was a respected expert on
the law and economics of regulation long
before he joined the Court and is the author
of Regulation and Its Reform,20 a standard text-
book for students of the regulatory process.
That expertise shone through in Breyer’s
scathing dissents to the majority decision in
both cases in which he raised the important
question of whether there was any rational
connection between the regulations the FCC
promulgated and the Telecom Act’s stated
goal of deregulating this sector. As Breyer
argued in the Verizon decision: “The prob-
lem before us—that of a lack of ‘rational con-
nection’ between the regulations and the
statute—grows out of the fact that the 1996
Act is not a typical regulatory statute asking
regulators simply to seek low prices, perhaps
by trying to replicate those of a hypothetical-
ly competitive market. Rather, this statute is
a deregulatory statute, and it asks regulators
to create prices that will induce appropriate
new entry.”21 Breyer goes on to correctly note
that the FCC’s TELRIC pricing rule and UNE
requirements “bring about, not the competi-
tive marketplace that the statute demands,
but a highly regulated marketplace charac-
terized by widespread sharing of facilities
with innovation and technological change
reflecting mandarin decision-making
through regulation rather than decentralized
decision-making based on the interaction of
freely competitive market forces. The majori-
ty nonetheless finds the Commission’s pric-
ing rules reasonable. As a regulatory theory,
that conclusion might be supportable. But
under this deregulatory statute, it is not.”22
Regrettably, the rest of the Court didn’t
accept Breyer’s arguments. Instead, the jus-
tices downplayed the negative disincentives
posed by such infrastructure-sharing rules
and simply deferred to the FCC’s “by any
means necessary” crusade to encourage new
rivals to enter this marketplace. Through its
actions, the agency has essentially proclaimed
that a nose count of new entrants is more
important than network investment and gen-
uine facilities-based competition. The wisdom
of that policy has been put to the test by indus-
try analysts and in the actual business market
and has been found wanting.23
In fact, in a comprehensive survey of the
CLEC market, Brookings Institution econo-
mist Robert Crandall has found that “CLECs
are best able to produce revenue growth by
building their own networks or significant
parts of their own networks. CLECs that only
resold the established carriers’ services were
generally unable to convert investments into
revenues, and these companies were likely to
fail.”24 In other words, markets are sending
policymakers a clear message: business models
that are heavily dependent on a forced-access
regulatory regime are not sustainable.25
Therefore, although the ostensible pur-
pose of all of that regulatory activity was to
create and maintain credible competitors to
the Baby Bells, the FCC has instead simply
created a small cottage industry of corporate
free riders without serious business plans or
chances for long-term survival.26 While there
is nothing wrong with voluntary wholesale
or resale arrangements between incumbents
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and new carriers, current forced-access man-
dates have artificially encouraged rivals to
flock to the reselling option and largely
ignore facilities-based alternatives. Thus,
open-access regulation has discouraged
investment in network upgrades and deploy-
ment, especially by incumbent carriers, who
fear that the imposition of unbundling and
line-sharing mandates on new services will
prevent them from recovering the exorbitant-
ly high fixed costs of network service. As
economists J. Gregory Sidak of the American
Enterprise Institute; David J. Teece, professor
at the Haas School of Business at the
University of California–Berkeley; and
Thomas M. Jorde, professor of law at the
University of California–Berkeley, argue:
Mandatory unbundling decreases an
ILEC’s [Incumbent Local Exchange
Carrier] incentive to invest in
upgrading its existing facilities by
reducing the ex ante payoffs of such
investment. Requiring a firm to
grant to its competitors unbundled
access to its facilities at TELRIC-
based rates greatly reduces, if it does
not eliminate entirely, the probabili-
ty of excess return; such mandatory
unbundling thus eliminates the
ILEC’s incentive to invest in existing
facilities. It makes no economic
sense for the ILEC to invest in tech-
nologies that lower its marginal
costs, so long as competitors can
achieve identical savings by regulato-
ry fiat.27
The wider economic harm caused by forced-
access regulation has been powerfully summa-
rized by Scott C. Cleland, chief executive officer
and founder of Precursor Group, a leading
Washington, D.C.–based investment research
organization specializing in investment trends
in the telecommunications and high-technolo-
gy sector. Cleland argues: 
Unfortunately, the Telecom Act and
FCC implementation have turned
out to be a bipartisan economic dis-
aster contributing to the severity and
length of the economic downturn in
telecom-tech. At the most basic eco-
nomic level, the Government set
wholesale prices below real cost in the
high–fixed cost, price-inelastic local
access market segment, poisoning
prospects for economically sound
facilities investment. Unintentionally,
government telecom policy is con-
tributing to the destruction of com-
panies, jobs, and shareholder wealth
by discouraging economic invest-
ment and rewarding uneconomic
investment.28
The U.S. Interconnection Rules and
Global Free-Trade Negotiations 
In summary, the FCC’s tortured econom-
ic reasoning and the Supreme Court’s mis-
placed support of it cannot change the fact
that network sharing has not been a very
good microeconomic business model or
macroeconomic investment thesis. Unfortu-
nately, however, the recent Supreme Court
decisions perpetuate the FCC’s models and
methods and encourage companies to con-
tinue to petition the regulators to rig the
rules in favor of generously discounted access
to existing and future communications net-
works and technologies. As Eli Noam, profes-
sor of economics and finance at the
Columbia Business School, summarized in a
recent editorial: “When in 1996 the Telecom
Act was passed, many people hailed it as a
Magna Carta of deregulation. It is turning
out to be the enabler of long-term regulatory
intervention and of a centralization of regu-
lation in Washington. Ironically, it is the eco-
nomic conservatives on the Supreme Court
who have now sanctioned this expansion of
central regulatory powers.”29 Consequently,
this sets the stage for years of additional reg-
ulatory proceedings and casts a dark cloud
over the emerging universe of broadband
technologies and services since the legal envi-
ronment remains riddled with uncertainty. 
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Three conclusions can be drawn from this
analysis of the Telecom Act and subsequent
FCC regulations for communications markets: 
1. America’s experiment with aggressive
open-access regulation has done little to
encourage credible facilities-based com-
petitors but has instead encouraged reg-
ulatory opportunists to take advantage
of a convoluted legal regime of
unbundling mandates and network
access price controls to hitch a free ride
on other carriers’ networks. (As dis-
cussed below, the most credible facilities-
based competitors that have arisen to
challenge the supremacy of incumbent
local telephone giants have been wireless
cellular providers, which are unregulated
and were largely ignored by the authors
of the Telecom Act.) Moreover, substan-
tial evidence now suggests that open-
access regulation has discouraged invest-
ment in network upgrades and deploy-
ment, especially by incumbent carriers,
who fear that the imposition of
unbundling and line-sharing mandates
on new services will prevent them from
recovering the exorbitantly high fixed
costs of network service.
2. For these reasons, the Telecom Act’s
new regulatory framework remains a
controversial and unsettled matter
within the United States. Policymakers
and judges at the federal and state levels
have challenged the wisdom of the act,
and some have attempted to signifi-
cantly modify or even strike down large
portions of the act’s infrastructure-
sharing provisions. Legislation has also
been introduced in the U.S. Congress to
reform those rules,30 and the FCC has
introduced several proceedings aimed
at loosening the impact of those man-
dates on industry.31
3. Finally, given the ongoing controversy
over the Telecom Act’s open-access reg-
ulatory regime, it should be clear that it
should not be employed as a model for
ongoing global trade negotiations. In
essence, the Telecom Act is an attempt
to manage trade in telecommunica-
tions markets. As such, it is hardly a
sensible framework for free trade in
telecom services worldwide. As Leonard
Waverman, professor of economics at
the London School of Business notes,
“[T]o enshrine current U.S. regulatory
issues in a multi-lateral trade agreement
is both foolish and dangerous.”32 And
economist Larry Darby similarly con-
cludes that “[the United States] should
not try to export the details of our reg-
ulatory approach or its rules, nor
should we develop negotiating strate-
gies that would tilt in that direction.”33
The Decline of Traditional
Telephony and What It
Means for Trade Policy
The preceding analysis makes it clear that
U.S. regulators have made an unfortunate
choice of legal regimes for the telecommuni-
cations sector. But an equally serious prob-
lem with the Telecom Act and subsequent
FCC rulemakings is their misplaced focus on
a marketplace that is clearly in decline: voice
telephony over analog, circuit-switched wire-
line networks. Voice traffic over the tradi-
tional telephone system is no longer as prof-
itable as it once was because many customers
are cutting their phone lines and moving to
alternative communications networks and
technologies.34 Wireless cellular systems and
Internet-based forms of communication
pose the most serious threat to traditional
providers. 
The Shift to Wireless
The most serious short-term threat to the
vitality of traditional wireline systems is wire-
less cellular service. Wireless telephony has
until recently been considered only a comple-
ment to wireline voice services, but recent
FCC surveys of wireless-wireline competition
reveal that “there is growing evidence that
consumers are substituting wireless service
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for traditional wireline communications. . . .
Several local carriers have attributed declin-
ing access line growth rates in part to substi-
tution by wireless.”35 An August 2002 report
by the credit-rating firm Moody’s similarly
argued that “wireless services could increas-
ingly displace local wireline voice services.”36
When the threat posed by wireless cellular
service is combined with the threat of cable
television providers who are increasingly
offering voice telephone service over their
systems,37 the threat to incumbent telephone
companies appears quite serious. Several
recent industry surveys and reports support
this contention:
• A January 2002 USA Today/CNN/
Gallup poll confirmed that a gradual
shift to wireless is well under way in
America. Eighteen percent—almost one
in five—of cell phone owners surveyed
consider their cell phones their “primary
phone.”38 As a result, in 5 to 10 years,
“the vast majority of us are going to be
using wireless phones as our main
phones,” noted telecom analyst Jeff
Kagan.39
•Forbes magazine recently reported that 9
million local (wireline) phone lines were
cut off in America in 2001, a 4.7 percent
decline in the total number of phone lines
from the year before.40 Further declines in
wireline use are expected for 2002.
• A recent study by IDC, a global technolo-
gy industry analysis firm, projected that
consumers will continue to opt for wire-
less services over wireline options and that
this will result in the displacement of 20
million wireline access lines by 2005.41
IDC attributes this shift to falling prices,
improved geographic service quality, and
the popularity of bundled pricing pro-
grams that provide evening and weekend
local and long-distance calling at little or
no additional cost.
•Telecompetition, Inc., a telecommunica-
tions networks and services forecasting
firm, recently predicted that wireless and
cable telephone service providers will steal
30 million access lines away from wireline
carriers over the next five years.42
Those reports and surveys make it clear
that communications consumers are substi-
tuting buckets of wireless minutes for tradi-
tional local and long-distance wireline service
and some are even “cutting the cord” as they
find they no longer need wireline service in
their homes. Some pioneering wireless firms,
such as San Diego, California–based Leap
Wireless, are even making that theme their
core business model as they craft service
plans meant to steal wireline users away for
good. Leap Wireless has 1.4 million cus-
tomers and more than a quarter of them have
eliminated their previous wireline provider
entirely.43 Leap’s chief executive Harvey
White recently told Forbes magazine that this
is part of a larger generational shift. “Our
demographic is younger,” noted White, “and
when people start a household today they
simply never bother to get a land line.”44
The Internet Challenge to Traditional
Telephony
An equally serious threat to the centrality
of traditional voice-based wireline telephone
networks comes from the rise of broadband
Internet protocol (IP) networks. The Internet
enables not only high-speed data transmission
but also the transmission of voice traffic
through Internet protocol or VoIP (voice over
IP). VoIP technology uses IP to deliver voice
information in the form of digital packets
rather than over traditional circuit-switched
analog networks.45 This technology could
make traditional telephone networks obsolete
in the relatively near future and serves as a clas-
sic example of what Clayton Christensen,
author of The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, refers to as
a “disruptive technology.”46
Christensen points out that disruptive
Internet technologies, such as VoIP, may
eventually supplant what he calls “sustaining
technologies,” such as the traditional tele-
phone network systems.47 The technological
paradigms for telephone networks and IP
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networks are quite different, and Christensen
argues that the new paradigm of packet-
switched communications networks (the
Internet) should supersede the old paradigm
of circuit-switched telecommunications net-
works (telephones).48
The significance of the new networks
must be taken into account in international
trade negotiations in this arena since this
may become a very disruptive technological
shift for traditional wireline providers. As
Peter Huber, Michael K. Kellogg, and John
Thorne, authors of Federal Telecommuni-
cations Law, summarize, “The advent of the
Internet generally, and IP telephony in par-
ticular, will be profoundly destabilizing for
the entire telecommunications industry.”49
That is already proving to be the case in
some countries as Internet networks grow
and data compression technologies advance.
Some global operators have laid out large-
capacity optical fiber networks for long-dis-
tance and international voice communica-
tions at cheap rates, without using conven-
tional long-distance telephone lines. In
China those operators have been offering
VoIP services since 1999, bypassing tele-
phone lines. By simply buying an IP tele-
phone card and connecting to the optical
fiber networks with an access code and a
mobile phone, one can make a call to the
United States at a very low rate.
Inexpensive VoIP access is possible because
network construction requires a reasonably
low investment and operational costs are sim-
ilarly modest. IP networks have been dubbed
the “Stupid Network” by David Isenberg
because the new IP networks rely on distrib-
uted knowledge and end-user capabilities.50
By comparison, in Isenberg’s analysis, tele-
phone networks are “Intelligent Networks”
because they rely on a remarkably complex
system of switches, circuits, and other sophis-
ticated tools and capabilities in networks to
ensure that calls are accurately placed, without
any errors or malfunctions. But upgrading the
networks requires a huge investment, since
intelligent switches must be constantly
replaced. The “Stupid Network,” on the other
hand, performs no functions on its own. All
the functions go to edges of networks and are
provided for, and controlled by, end-user ter-
minals. Any terminal can be plugged into the
network, as long as it is compatible with IP.
Therefore, running costs for the IP networks
are minimal, and low rates for network usage
can be maintained.
Thus, the telephone industry today faces
the reality of shrinking network use and
declining profitability as wireless- and
Internet-sector firms and technologies chal-
lenge the hegemony of traditional voice
providers. It is unlikely that the volume of
communications traffic over traditional ana-
log telephone networks will grow significant-
ly in this environment. Regrettably, however,
despite this seismic shift, U.S. trade negotia-
tors continue to be preoccupied with micro-
managing trade in traditional wireline tele-
phone markets.
Mistakes Made during 
U.S.-Japan Trade Talks
Despite clear signs that the wireline voice
marketplace is in a state of decline, it seems
that the U.S. government is myopically
focused on the well-being of this industry
sector. Worse yet, it has become abundantly
clear that American trade negotiators are
attempting to dictate the terms of Japan’s
domestic telecommunications policy.  
For example, during the U.S.-Japan talks in
2000, American trade negotiators argued that
U.S. long-distance telephone operators pay
overly high connection fees to Japanese
regional operators, such as NTT East
Corporation, NTT West Corporation, and
NTT DoCoMo (all subsidiaries of Nippon
Telegram and Telephone Corporation) and
are not allowed to compete fairly in the
Japanese market. Despite that claim, however,
some European telephone companies have
successfully entered the Japanese market. 
During the talks, the U.S. government
also claimed that NTT’s high interconnec-
tion fees were preventing the expansion of
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Internet use in Japan. That is a misleading
claim, however, because the interconnection
fees charged long-distance operators by NTT
companies do not directly affect Japan’s
Internet users. As in the United States, nar-
rowband Internet users normally dial a local
number to connect to the Internet. Only
users who call long distance to access the
Internet might benefit from reduced connec-
tion fees in the form of possibly lower long-
distance rates, but those long-distance callers
are a very small minority. For the vast major-
ity of users who connect locally to the
Internet, the basic local dial-up rate is far
more relevant. If NTT companies are forced
to raise local rates to offset income lost from
reducing interconnection fees for long-dis-
tance operators, those price increases could
have a negative impact on the spread of
Internet use in Japan. 
In accordance with the July 2000 U.S.-
Japan agreement, NTT regional companies
did lower interconnection fees by 20 percent.
NTT companies also lowered local rates last
year as a result of the introduction of the “My
Line” (preselection) system in Japan, which
required consumers to choose their own
local, long-distance, and international tele-
phone carriers. (NTT used to be the “default”
carrier; consumers were automatically con-
nected to NTT unless they signed up for
another carrier.) NTT East and West have
both suffered severe declines in revenue; NTT
West has not yet recovered the lines it lost.
Under these circumstances, NTT companies
have been forced to refrain from new capital
investment projects, which will hurt Japanese
consumers in the long term.
The arguments made by the USTR during
the 2000 trade talks also included contradic-
tory objectives for competition policy. The
USTR criticized NTT’s domination of the
Japanese market, claiming that more than 95
percent of local telephone lines (facilities and
physical lines) belong to NTT. The USTR
therefore demanded that other operators
besides NTT invest in new facilities and lines
to introduce more competition in the mar-
ket. On the other hand, the USTR also
requested a reduction in NTT’s interconnec-
tion rates in accordance with America’s TEL-
RIC pricing model to require the unbundling
and sharing of NTT lines at greatly discount-
ed rates. When such extensive unbundling
and line-sharing rules are promoted, other
telephone operators are likely to use NTT’s
facilities and lines to provide service instead
of building their own—an effect much like
that of the CLECs in America. Consequently,
the USTR is making contradictory demands
on Japan, since infrastructure sharing and
facilities-based competition are conflicting
objectives. 
And, again, it is worth pointing out that
the FCC is reviewing its regulations and
beginning to ease the unbundling obliga-
tions of U.S. regional telephone companies
in light of the problems those rules have
caused in the American marketplace. So it
makes little sense for the USTR to demand
that a foreign country do something that is
contrary to the communication policies of its
own country.
The USTR has also issued misleading
claims regarding interconnection fees for
wireless services, which U.S. international
carriers pay to Japanese wireless operators.
The USTR criticizes Japanese wireless opera-
tors for charging high interconnection fees
and argues that the fees are harmful to U.S.
operators and consumers. However, when an
American consumer calls from the United
States to a mobile phone user in Japan, U.S.
international carriers charge the American
consumer more than Japanese operators
charge the American consumer. Therefore,
the high prices that U.S. consumers are pay-
ing are mainly due to the charges imposed by
U.S. international carriers.
Finally, it should be reiterated that the
U.S.-Japan talks on open-market policies in
the field of telecommunications have
focused primarily on the wireline telephone
sector, a declining market in both America
and Japan. Cellular phones may be a growing
sector, but as long as they are connected to
conventional telephone lines, the old indus-
try interconnection rules will likely apply.
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But as packet-switched and Internet-based
telephony becomes a reality, the whole issue
of interconnection fees will be drastically
reframed.
Importance of Differences between U.S.
and Japanese Political Systems
One can better understand why the USTR
relied on the old paradigm in bringing up
those issues by examining who is advising the
trade negotiators when they engage in talks
on these matters. For instance, the USTR col-
lects comments from the private sector to
prepare the section 1377 review. Comments
from companies, such as AT&T, BellSouth,
Comptel, and the Telecommunications
Industry Association were taken into
account in preparing this year’s review. 51 The
USTR naturally listens to, and relies heavily
on, those corporations and associations
when engaged in complex trade negotiations
over technical matters such as telecommuni-
cations policy. The FCC also has an informal
advisory role.
The Japanese political system is different,
however. The Japanese counterpart to the
USTR in the trade negotiations is the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no gov-
ernment agency equivalent to the USTR.
MOFA gets input on telecommunications
negotiations from the Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications, which oversees
telecommunications policies. But MOFA
and MPHPT do not necessarily represent
corporate interests, although they do work
for the Japanese people and national inter-
ests. Their political posture is similar to that
of the U.S. State Department, which works to
further broad national interests but does not
represent particular corporate interests. 
The USTR has continued to complain
that MPHPT and NTT are one and the same.
The ministry did set up a public telecommu-
nications entity once, a predecessor to NTT.
Since NTT was privatized in 1985, a kind of
tension has persisted between the ministry
and NTT. They do not cooperate in the way
that the USTR and telecommunications
companies work together to pursue common
interests. Their interests are often irreconcil-
able. NTT’s management wants the best
solution for its own operations, while the
ministry wants to take control of telecom-
munications policies as a regulator. The min-
istry needs to approach negotiations with
balanced proposals to satisfy the U.S. govern-
ment, new Japanese common carriers, and
NTT. Therefore, its policy decisions on
deregulation and other trade issues do not
necessarily accord with NTT’s views.
Impact on U.S. Industries
It is also incorrect to assume that a reduc-
tion in NTT’s interconnection rates would
unambiguously benefit the United States. As
a consequence of the revenue losses incurred
by reducing fees, NTT East Corporation and
NTT West Corporation have less money to
spare for investment expenditures. They have
purchased large amounts of U.S.-made com-
munications equipment each year, but their
budgetary constraints will leave them able to
afford fewer U.S. products. The purchase of
U.S. goods has also been a trade issue since
the late 1970s, and Japanese companies,
including NTT, have stepped up efforts to
procure U.S. high-tech equipment. While
U.S. telecommunications services operators
would benefit from reduced interconnection
rates and possibly increased profits, U.S. ven-
dors to NTT companies would lose sales.
It is plausible to assume that telephone
company profits will eventually go up, as com-
munication volume increases because of lower
connection fees and consequent lower rates.
But a substantial increase in volume is unlike-
ly even with lower rates, since the Japanese tele-
phone market is already saturated. The reduc-
tion of interconnection rates has only caused
financial harm to NTT companies.
Ultimately, what the USTR and many U.S.
companies profess to want is access to the
Japanese telecommunications service market.
The Japanese market is already very open to
new entrants—no regulations prevent them
from operating in Japan, except for a law man-
dating that one-third of NTT shares belong to
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the Japanese government. Vodafone, a British
company that became a majority shareholder
of Japan Telecom Company, has successfully
made inroads into the Japanese market. NTT’s
facilities and lines are equally accessible to any
foreign operator. 
If foreign companies fail to enter the
Japanese market, it is more likely due to the
fact that they may have problems securing
investment for foreign expansion, or do not
have appropriate services to offer Japanese
consumers. One does not have to go to busi-
ness school to understand that it is important
to offer unique services that appeal to con-
sumers in different cultures. Successful
American companies localize their products
and services. Exporting what is offered in the
United States to a foreign country is not nec-
essarily the right formula for successful mar-
keting. If Toyota were to introduce new cars
with right-side steering wheels from Japan
into the United States, and the Japanese gov-
ernment demanded that American automak-
ers start producing right-side steering wheels,
the U.S. government would probably advise
the Japanese to study the U.S. market first. 
Conclusion: A New Vision
for Telecom Trade Policy 
While the United States, through USTR
negotiators, meddles with the declining wire-
line telephone industry in foreign countries,
many parts of the world are making rapid
advances with new communications and
broadband industries and technologies.
Canada, Korea, and Japan have made amaz-
ing strides in this regard, and broadband
subscribership is growing faster in those
countries than in the United States. 
U.S. officials should not waste time tin-
kering with the old telecommunications par-
adigm attempting to fix the problems of the
past. America has been the principal leader in
the development of new markets and tech-
nologies, but of late it seems that U.S. tele-
com regulators and trade negotiators are less
interested in promoting new technological
solutions and markets than they are in
micromanaging old ones. At some point, this
could have a serious impact on American
competitiveness. “The U.S. jumped into
broadband ahead of most of the rest of the
world,” notes Scott Woolley of Forbes. “But
today subscriber rolls are climbing faster
overseas, where monthly bills are lower and
speeds are faster.”52
Moreover, the misguided focus on micro-
managing old telecommunications networks
across the globe is likely to generate resent-
ment among trading partners if the United
States continues to insist that the rest of the
world remake its telecom sectors in the image
of America’s heavy-handed Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996. Trade negotiators
should instead refine their telecommunica-
tions and trade policies to reflect technologi-
cal advances and conduct constructive nego-
tiations based on emerging market realities.
They should realize that wireless services and
the Internet are assuming a more dominant
role in the communications market, pushing
aside the traditional telephone industry and
its corresponding regulatory paradigm. It is a
waste of time for governments to engage in
bitter negotiations over the issues of the past. 
What then should concern trade negotia-
tors? To begin, to the maximum extent possi-
ble, all governments should agree to deal with
these matters within the WTO’s multilateral
framework. WTO processes take longer than a
bilateral framework, but bilateral negotiations
over such technical matters often tend to
become too political to reach reasonable con-
clusions. Even though the Basic Telecom
accord is flawed, it still presents the best oppor-
tunity to successfully implement comprehen-
sive liberalization across the globe.
Second, whether trade negotiators pursue
either bilateral or multilateral telecommuni-
cations trade agreements, they should limit
their focus to the most serious barriers to for-
eign direct investment. Most countries,
including the United States, continue to have
percentage-based caps on the amount of for-
eign investment that is allowed in the market
or in specific industries and companies.
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Those rules are ripe for reform. Negotiators
may also deal with market investment issues,
such as undersea cable landing rights, access
to public rights-of-way, access to spectrum
licenses or permission to bid in ongoing
spectrum auctions, and international orbital
assignments for communications satellites.
While such objectives would be worthy of
discussion as part of any ongoing trade nego-
tiations, what should not be considered in
trade negotiations are far more specific rules
or policy paradigms that require countries to
adopt very detailed regulatory regimes for
their domestic markets. For example, univer-
sal service subsidization policies or intercon-
nection and network unbundling rules, like
those the United States has been attempting
to force on Japan, are not appropriate issues
for negotiation.53 The focus should be on
removing traditional barriers to investment,
not the wholesale restructuring of entire
industries (especially old or dying sectors) to
conform to some grandiose vision of what a
“perfectly competitive” market is supposed
to look like.
Finally, as global leaders in telecom mar-
kets, U.S. and Japanese officials should lead a
multinational effort to facilitate the growth of
nascent telecom and broadband markets in
developing nations. Governments do not need
to directly inject capital into those markets or
provide aid to accomplish this goal. Rather,
they should encourage less-developed coun-
tries to open their markets to much-needed
foreign investment by well-established indus-
try players and adopt a simple set of rules for
ongoing competition within this sector. A
more coherent multilateral vision would itself
stimulate the markets by attracting venture
capital, private equity, and other forms of
investment. 
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